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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
EDWARD A. DOLLMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 43671
Canyon County Case No.
CR-2015-9001

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Dollman failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by
imposing a unified sentence of 10 years, with two years fixed, upon his guilty plea to
felony injury to children?

Dollman Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion
Dollman pled guilty to felony injury to children and the district court imposed a
unified sentence of 10 years, with two years fixed. (R., pp.51-52.) Dollman filed a
notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.53-54.)
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Dollman asserts his sentence is excessive in light of his age and immaturity.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.4-8.) The record supports the sentence imposed.
Appellate courts review a criminal sentence under an abuse of discretion
standard.

State v. Calley, 140 Idaho 663, 665-666, 99 P.3d 616, 618-619 (2004).

Sentences fixed within the statutory limits will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of
discretion. State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 284, 77 P.3d 956, 973 (2003). When a
sentence is challenged as being excessively harsh, appellate courts independently
review the record on appeal, having due regard for the nature of the offense, the
character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. Calley, 140 Idaho at
666, 99 P.3d at 619.

In order to prevail, a defendant must demonstrate that the

sentence “in light of the governing criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of
the facts.” Id. Sentences are reasonable if “it appears at the time of sentencing that
confinement is necessary ‘to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and
to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution
applicable to a given case.’” Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 284, 77 P.3d at 973. A sentence
need not serve all sentencing goals; one may be sufficient. Id. at 285, 77 P.3d at 974
(citing State v. Waddell, 119 Idaho 238, 241, 804 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Ct. App.1991)).
However, as a matter of policy in Idaho, the primary consideration in sentencing is the
good order and protection of society, and all other factors are subservient to that end.
State v. Hunnel, 125 Idaho 623, 627, 873 P.2d 877, 881 (1994) (citing State v. Moore,
78 Idaho 359, 363, 304 P.2d 1101, 1103 (1956)).
The maximum prison sentence for felony injury to children is 10 years. I.C. § 181501(1). The district court imposed a unified sentence of 10 years, with two years fixed,
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which falls well within the statutory guidelines. (R., pp.51-52.) At sentencing, the state
addressed Dollman’s repeated sexual offending against children, his high risk to
reoffend, his lack of amenability to community-based treatment, his failure to rehabilitate
despite having previously participated in sex offender treatment, the psychosexual
evaluator’s recommendation for incarceration, and the danger Dollman poses to the
community. (Tr., p.31, L.10 – p.36, L.22.) The state submits that Dollman has failed to
establish an abuse of discretion, for reasons more fully set forth in the attached excerpt
of the sentencing hearing transcript, which the state adopts as its argument on appeal.
(Appendix A.)

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Dollman’s conviction and
sentence.

DATED this 12th day of April, 2016.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming __________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 12th day of April, 2016, served a true and
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to:
BRIAN R. DICKSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming ________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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conclusions throughout the presentence materials
portraying my client with antisocial tendencies.
3 To the extent that that is a factual
4 determination, my client would disagree with that.
5 And then I think he's got a -- an address where he
6 would be staying If he were released. That's his
7 gr11nc1mother's address at 604 lane -- 609 -8 609 Lang in Parma. Those are the changes of which
9 I'm aware, Judge.
10
THE COURT: Thank you. The state aware of
11 any factual inaccuracies that should be brought to
1.! my attention?
13
MS. l<ALLIN: Judge, the only thing that is
14 of concern to me is that In -- on page 9 of the
16 presentence Investigation, It references a son
16 that he has, Adam Dallman. I have had contact
17 with another young woman by the name of
18 Brittany Bulger, who Indicated that Mr. Dollman
19 also impregnated her, and I don't see it reflected
20 in the PSI. That or there's a typo with regards
21 to who the mother of Adam Dollman is. But I -22 I've had contact with this young woman and am
23 aw,He that at le;ist that's lhe ;illeyatio11 is, that
24 he Is the father of her child.
~---~-GROVE: Judge, could we have that
1
2
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reflected as just an allegation, that there hasn't
been any determination of paternity yet?
THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to
make that -- that doesn't sound like a significant
change in the presentence materials. I'm not
going to put that in here, because - MS. !(ALLIN: Judge, I do think It bc.irs
relevance, because she was 14 at the time th<'lt she
was impregnated as well.
THE COURT: Well -- this Is just Information
that you have, not information that was given to
the presentence Investigator?
MS. !<ALLIN: It was not given to the
presentence investigator ••
THE COURT: Well, then I'm not going to put
it In.
MS. KALLIN: Judge, I would simply just ask
that that at least be indicated as an allegation,
because I know that Mr. Dollman and his mother
have had contact with this child, and that he's
taken on responslbllltles as the child's father.
And so I've had numerous contActs with Ms. Rulger,
<1nd that's how I'm familiar with this.
MR. GROVE: Judge, my client advises he has
had no contact. His mother has, but he has not.
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THE COURT: Well, I -- once again, I've
already ruled, and I'm not going to change my
mind. Are the -- does either side wish to present
evidence in oggrt'.lvt'.ltion or mitig.ition?
MR. GROVC: No evidence from the defense,
Judge.
MS. KALLIN: No, Judge.
THE COURT: Okay. I'll hear the state's
comments first of all.
MS, KALLIN: Your Honor, Mr, Dollman comes
before the Court. This is his first felony
conviction as an adult. However, he has engaged
in a continued course of sexual offending on
children starting in 2009 when he was
dispositioned for lewd conduct with a minor. That
child, as is reflected in the presentence
investigation and the psychosexual evaluation, was
five years old at the time.
M, I just alluded to, there arc
RllegAtions thflt he, while 17, engi,ged in
intercourse with a 14-year-old and impregnated
her, and then we have this situation that comes
before the Court, where It -- he engaged In sexual
i11len:ourse wilh c1 13-ye;ir-old. The Court, I arn
sure, had the opportunity to review the facts as
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1 set out by the victim, as well as the facts that
2 are set up -- set out by the defendant.
3
JudQe, I will note so that the Court Is
4 .iwure thot .iccording to the victim in this cuse,
5 she Indicated that there are several other girls
6 that the defendant has that are -- that are around
7 the age of 13 that the defendant was engaging in
8 sexual intercourse with.
9
On page 8 - - Bates stamped 8 of the
10 police report, she specifically talks about
11 Brittany Bulger. She also talks about
12 Megan WIiiiams. One was 15, the other was 18.
13 And I can indicate to the Court there were
14 certainly allegations or concerns that they were
15 following up on, which is part of the reason that
16 they submitted this case for charging, in addition
17 to the fact that there was a five-year age
18 difference, and the victim in this case made
19 ollegatlons with regards to force.
20
The most signiflr.Rnt p1:1rt of -- or the
21 most significant concern that the state has is
22 borne out in the psychosexual evaluation.
23 Dr. Johnston, who does probably one of the most
24 thorough psyd1osexual evc1luc1tions out of all of
26 the evaluators, went through a series of tests, as
11 of 1s sheets
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well as interviews as to determine the defendant's
risk to reottend. Particularly, Dr. Johnston
identified the fact that the defendant engaged in
antlsoclal personality characteristics, he has
poor impulse control, has a high sex drive, and
attitudes that support sexual offending.
He is determined to be a high risk to
reoffend, and is not amenable to comm11nity-hRserl
treatment, or as Dr. Johnston put it, he - - while
he was determined to be as amenable, that that
treatment should take place in a structured
selling whereas to limit his access to potential
victims and the opportunity to commit a future
sexual offense.
I think it's important to note the
deviation in that language. Dr. Johnston
typically with these individuals, if he believes
that they would benefit from the µreprowarmnir1q
available on a retained jurisdiction, will
indicate under subsection 4 on page 2 of the
psychosexual evaluation that treatment begin In a
structured setting with supervision -- or with -with the rlefenrlant transferring to -- the
supervision within the community once progress is
demonstrated.

1
Dr. Johnston very clearly does not
2 indicate that, but rather is Indicating that he
3 should remain incarcerated, where he won't have
4 access to potential victims. Particularly,
5 Dr. Johnston, in looking at the difference between
6 whether or not some of the different concerns are
7 risk foctors for the defendunt, on page -.. excuse
A mt'!, I thought r had It tabbed. I apologize.

9
On page 32, as well as throughout the
10 report, Dr. Johnston Indicates that he's less
11 likely to comply with supervision than typical sex
12 offenders, based upon the fact that he minimizes
13 his -- his role and responsibility in this case,
14 based upon his high number of static risk
15 variables, the number of dynamic risk variables,
16 and the antisocial and behavior Issues coupled
17 with his young age and what appears to be an
18 overall resistance to being held accountable for
19 his behavior.
20
And I think as Dr. Johnston indicates,
21 part of the concern Is the fact that the defendant
22 has gone through sex offP.nder treatmP.nt and
23 programming, and that did not seem to be sud1 Ural
24 would deter him from engaging In these - - these
25 moderately predatory behaviors. that .he did with
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the victim in question.
The state in this case cut the
defendant a break by not requiring that he
register as a sex offender. However, It appears
based on the psychosexu;:il evaluation that
protection of our -- that in order to ensure
protection In our community, there Is only one
uppropriate solution, and that Is a renltentiMy
sentence to protect our community and to protect
those who most likely would -- he would most
likely reoffend on, which according to
Dr. Johnston on page 1 -- excuse me -- page 2 of
the psychosexual evaluation, would be Individuals
who arc readily available, easily mnnirulr1terl,
sexually curious, or willing participants. And
also a concern that the defendant, because of
anger issues, may use force in a future sexual
offense. The only way to ensure protection of the
community from an individual such as Mr. Dollrnan
Is a penitentiary sentence.
The state in this case is asking that
this Court impose a period of two years fixed
followed by eight years indeterminate. A -- for a
total unified sentence of ten years. That is the
statutory max, and it's lhe stc1te's µosilion that
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that Is appropriate when we are dealing with
someone who is a high r isk to reoffend and who is
a repeat sexual offender.
We would ask in this case that there be
a $3,000 civil penalty payable to the victim In
this case, under 19-5307. We'd also ask that the
defendant be required to submit a DNA sample and
right thumbprint, and that there be a no-contact
on..ler with the victim in this Clise.
Ultimately, when you look at the
factors under State versus Toohill, community
protection is first and foremost, and when we're
dealing with an individual who is a high risk to
reottend, and who, according to the psychosexual
evaluation, is an individual who needs to be
Incarcerated so as to limit his access to
potential victims, it's clear we're dealing with
an individual who poses a danger, and that first
factor under Toohill Is the most Important, It's
the state's belief that this sentence accomrlishes
the Toohill factors first and foremost to protect
the community. Thank you.
THE COURT: Just a few questions. Don't go
away.
MS. KALLIN: Yes, Your Honor.
12 or ts sheets

